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Creating a system that is always protected and secure 
in all situations against all attackers is a far-reaching 
and likely impossible goal. It is important for 
researchers to continue to move systems closer towards 
absolute security, but it is also essential to create 
techniques so a system can adaptively defend against 
an attacker who circumvents the current security. 
Deception for cyber defense approaches this goal—to 
rebalance the asymmetric nature of computer defense 
by increasing attacker workload while decreasing that 
of the defender.  
Cyber deception is a collection of defensive techniques 
that considers the human component of cyber attacks. 
Deception holds promise as a successful tactic for 
making an attacker’s job harder because it does more 
than just block access: it can also cause the attacker to 
waste both time and effort. Moreover, deception can be 
used by a defender to impart an incorrect belief in the 
attacker, the effects of which can go beyond any static 
defense. Understanding the cognition and behavior of 
both the cyber defender and cyber attacker is a critical 
component of cybersecurity. 
In the cyber world, an attacker often only knows what 
is perceived through observation of the target network. 
The intruder may be thousands of miles away from the 
network to which he or she is attempting to gain entry. 
Networks often unintentionally provide more 
information to an attacker than defenders would like. 
However, the network owner also has the opportunity 
to reveal information he or she desires the attacker to 
know—including deceptive information. Because 
network information is often complex and incomplete, 
it provides a natural environment in which to imbed 
deception since, in chaos, there is opportunity. 
Deception can alter the mindset, confidence, and  
 
 
 
decision-making process of an attacker, which can be 
more effective than traditional defenses. Furthermore, 
using deception for defensive purposes gives the 
defender at least partial control of what an attacker will 
know, and provides opportunities for strategic 
interaction with an attacker.  
These research efforts require an interdisciplinary 
approach which is exemplified in the accepted papers 
which cross multiple disciplines. It is essential to 
understand attacker and defender cognition and 
behavior to effectively and strategically use cyber 
deception to induce cognitive biases and increase 
cognitive load, making our systems difficult to attack. 
This minitrack provides a venue for innovative 
research that rigorously examines advancements in 
cyber deception technologies, evaluations, case studies 
and models of cyber deception effects, as well as 
improved understanding of the cognition and behaviors 
of cyber operators. This year the minitrack features the 
following eleven papers and is closely linked to the 
HICSS-53 symposium entitled “Cyber Psychology 
Aids National Security”: 
• “Design of Dynamic and Personalized Deception: 
A Research Framework and New Insights” (by 
Cleotilde Gonzalez, Palvi Aggarwal, Christian 
Lebiere, Edward Cranford) 
• “Delivering Honeypots as a Service” (by Jafar 
Haadi Jafarian, Amirreza Niakanlahiji) 
• “Creating Convincing Industrial-Control-System 
Honeypots” (by Neil Rowe, Thuy Nguyen, Marian 
Kendrick, Zaky Rucker, Dahae Hyun, Justin 
Brown) 
• “Invasion of the Botnet Snatchers: A Case Study 
in Applied Malware Cyberdeception” (by Jared 
Chandler, Kathleen Fisher, Erin Chapman, Eric 
Davis, Adam Wick) 
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• “Towards a Holistic Model of Deception: Subject 
Matter Expert Validation” (by Iaian Reid, Rob 
Black)  
• “The Moonraker Study: An Experimental 
Evaluation of Host-Based Deception” (by Temmie 
Shade, Andrew Rogers, Kimberly Ferguson-
Walter, Sara Beth Elsen, Daniel Fayette, Kristin 
Heckman) 
• “Adaptive Cyber Deception: Cognitively Informed 
Signaling for Cyber Defense” (by Edward 
Cranford, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Palvi Aggarwal, 
Sarah Cooney, Milind Tambe, Christian Lebiere) 
• “HoneyBug: Personalized Cyber Deception for 
Web Applications” (by Amirreza Niakanlahiji, 
Jafar Haadi Jafarian, Bei-Tseng Chu, Ehab Al-
Shaer) 
• “A Deception Planning Framework for Cyber 
Defense” (by Jafar Haadi Jafarian, Amirreza 
Niakanlahiji) 
• “Concealing Cyber-Decoys using Two-Sided 
Feature Deception Games” (by Mohammad Sujan 
Miah, Marcus Gutierrez, Oscar Veliz, Omkar 
Thakoor, Christopher Kiekintveld) 
• “Automating Cyberdeception Evaluation with 
Deep Learning” (by Gbadebo Ayoade, Frederico 
Araujo, Khaled Al-naami, Ahmad Mustafa, Yang 
Gao, Kevin Hamlen, Latifur Khan) 
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